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A Nation Without a Supreme Court*
JOSE M. CABAN11-A
The Constitution of the Confederate States of America,
unanimously adopted on March 11, 1861, by the as-
sembled delegates of the original seceding states and
on June 19, 1861, by the state of Virginia, was for all
practical purposes a copy of the Constitution of the
United States. Its judicial provisions begin in Article
III with the familiar-sounding phrase "The judicial
powers of the Confederate States shall be vested in one
supreme court and. . . ." There is no reason to believe
that this phraseology was a blind copy of the older docu-
ment, and that it was not the intention of the framers
of the Confederate -Constitution to include the provisions
for supreme judicial review in the chart that was to guide
the newborn nation. Nearly sixty years had passed since
John Marshall had brilliantly expounded the necessity
for supreme judicial autho-rity over the acts of the vari-
ous legislative and executive bodies that comprised the
nation and the years had only confirmed the wisdom of
his decision. Surely the forty-four delegates who signed
the Constitution of the Confederate States were aware of
this necessity when they retained a provision for a su-
preme court within the confederation. Otherwise it would
have been a simple matter to expunge such a require-
ment from the instrument that they were drafting.
In spite of the constitutional requirement for the
establishment of a supreme court within the judicial
structure of the Confederacy, in spite of the historical
need for a court of supreme jurisdiction, the supreme
* Based on Patrick, Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet and Opinions of the
Confederate Attorneys General.
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court authorized by the Confederate Constitution never
came into being. Perhaps the loss of national prestige
suffered by the United States Supreme Court following
its Dred Scott decision played a part in the failure of
the Confederate Congress to establish such -a court, al-
though the Dred Scott decision should have enhanced the
United States Court in the eyes of sympathizers with the
Southern cause. Perhaps the seceding -states, having
found a strong federal government to their dislike were
loath to establish a strong central agency that might en-
croach on their jealously guarded sovereign rights. An
indication that such a state of mind existed is found in
the Virginia ordinance adopting the Constitution of the
Confederate States. A clause in this ordinance reserved
to the people of Virginia the right to renounce at a later
date the newly-adopted constitution if they so found it
desirable. At any rate, and for whatever reasons, the
supreme court provided for in the Confederate 0onsti-
tution was never established -and the power of supreme
judicial review was never officially vested in any one
particular body or official of the Confederacy.
In the first few months of its life the new nation was
undoubtedly too concerned with the vital issues of its
existence, primarily with the organization of a central
government, to worry about the legality of judicial de-
cisions or legislative acts. But eventually and inevitably
there arose issues requiring the interpretation of statutes
or questioning the constitutionality of state -and con-
federate legislation. Without a court of supreme judicial
review, empowered to decide those issues, the heads of
the Confederate Government, from President Davis on
down, turned to the highest offiial of the Department of
Justice, the Attorney-General, for assistance.
The first instance of a decision on constitutional issues
found among the recorded opinions of the Attorneys-
General appears to be the one rendered by Thomas
Hill Watts who, on December 12, 1862, in a letter to the
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Secretary of War, regarding payments for services ren-
dered by an individual under the Conscription and Ex-
emption Act, wrote: "That he should be paid for his
services, there can be no doubt." Since this issue had
been brought before the Attorney-General on the
grounds of the constitutionality of the above Act, he ap-
pears to have ruled on this point in one short sentence.
Attorney-General Watts in a letter again written to the
Secretary of W"ar, on May 22, 1863, had this to say re-
garding the duties of his office: "In giving opinions to
the President and the Heads of the Executive Depart-
ments, the Attorney-General is acting in the capacity of
a Judge and must be governed by the same rules which
govern Judges." He then proceeded to hold that an act
of Congress passed on April 29, 1863, for the purpose of
including certain temporary employees within the pro-
visions of previously-enacted legislation, was unconsti-
tutional and void in so far as its retroactive features
were concerned.
Wade Keyes, acting Attorney-General, in a letter to
the Secretary of the Treasury, under date of August 13,
1863, dealing with the legality of certain regulations is-
sued by the Secretary under an act of Congress, wrote:
"My opinion is against the legality of the said Regula-
tions and against the competency of the Secretary of the
Treasury to issue them."
The preceding quotations appear to be more in the
nature of formal opinions than of constitutional decisions
but on December 18, 1863, Wade Keyes was more ex-
plicit when ruling on the constitutionality of a state act.
In 1863 a citizen of Virginia had entered into a contract
to supply the Confederate Government with whiskey for
the use of a Confederate Army. On March 12, 1863, the
Legislature of Virginia enacted a law making it an of-
fense to manufacture any whiskey or other spirituous
or malt liquors and at a later session, on October 31,
1863, expressly prohibited the fulfillment of any contract
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for the making of ardent spirits which might have been
entered into with the Confederate Government. When re-
quested by the Secretary of War to pass on the legality
of the acts of the Virginia Legislature, Keyes replied:
... a state has not the power to forbid the fulfillment
of a contract which the Conferate Government has the
authority to make: and ... the Act of October 31st,
expressly forbidding the fulfillment of such a contract,
is a nullity."
In early 1864 the Confederate Navy commenced the
erection of a distillery in South Carolina for the purpose
of distilling whiskey for the sole use of the Confederate
Navy. When the Governor of South Carolina required
that the work be discontinued on the grounds that the
laws of that state prohibited the establishment of dis-
tilleries, the conflict was referred to George Davis, the
last of the Confederate Attorneys General. In an opin-
ion dated March 7, 1864, he referred to the Keyes' opin-
ion of December 7, 1863, and added: "The States . ..
have made the Constitution of the Confederate States
their Supreme Law, before which all other laws must
yield. That Constitution empowers Congress 'to provide
and maintain a Navy.' Both powers are full and com-
plete . . .They were intended to be beyond the control
of the States; and they must be so, or else become a mere
nullity."
In an opinion rendered by Attorney-General Davis
on October 25, 1864, to the Secretary of War, regarding
the constitutionality of a section of the Conscription Act,
he said: "That is a question which it is not competent
for you to decide . .. the Head of an Executive Depart-
ment cannot refuse to execute the clearly expressed will
of Congress on the ground that it violates the Constitu-
tion. That is a Judicial question, and must be left to the
Courts of Law." On November 30, 1864, in a letter to
the Secretary of War, again dealing -with the trouble-
some Virginia anti-distilling statutes, Attorney-General
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Davis advised the Secretary that the matter be laid be-
fore the Governor of Virginia with the request that he
call it to the attention of the Legislature. And in a letter
to the Secretary of the Treasury on January 11, 1865,
Attorney-General Davis advised the Secretary that the
Justice Department "... had accepted it as a general
rule, to decline giving opinions as to the constitutionality
of any Act of Congress, upon the ground that even if the
opinion of the Attorney-General be against the constitu-
tionality of any Act, it would still be the duty of the
Executive Departments to enforce the laws, until other-
wise instructed by the Judicial Tribunals." In these
words did the Attorney-General express the futility that
he must have come to feel regarding the effect that the
rulings of his office might have on the constitutionality
of laws. By then the days of the Confederacy were num-
bered and the flight from Richmond on April 3, 1865, put
an end to the activities of the Attorney-General.
The lack of a supreme court to pass on the few in-
stances of conflict between state and Confederate laws
and the Constitution was felt by all the Attorneys-General
and every one of them at one time or another recom-
mended that such a court, as provided by the Constitu-
tion, be established. But the lack of supreme court re-
view never did really hamper the central government;
state court decisions in conflict with the Constitution
were either ignored by the Confederate Government or
considered effective only within the jurisdiction of the
courts rendering them. In the matter of the constitution-
ality of laws, the administration was guided by the
opinions of the Attorney-General which were, as could be
expected, mostly favorable to the administration. In this
way, decisions favorable to the conduct of the war, the
major issue in the struggle for existence, were assured.
The Confederacy was a short-lived experiment and,
in so far as a test to determine the need for a supreme
court is concerned, it was an experiment conducted in an
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inadequate laboratory. That its life was unhindered by
the absence of a supreme court was due more to the
necessity for mutual assistance and support at a time
'when the nation's existence was at stake than to the
ability of a group of states to coexist -without a national
court of last resort. That the nation could have con-
tinued to exist so unhindered in times of peace is a ques-
tion still open to debate. And so the query, so often
posed by so many people, as to the necessity for a su-
preme court in our system of democratic government
'Must, in so far as ,he experience of the Confederacy is
concerned, remains unanswered.
